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Introduction 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures refer to any of the laws, rules, standards, 
and procedures that governments employ to protect humans, other animals, and plants 
from diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. SPS standards as concealed 
protectionist tools and barriers to trade have been extensively investigated in the literature. 
Many studies indicate that SPS standards are becoming significant barriers to 
international trade of food and agricultural products (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; Liu and 
Yue, 2009; Yue, Beghin and Jensen, 2006).  A common concern is that unnecessarily 
strict health and safety regulations would increase the production or trade costs of 
imports, distort international trade, and cause mercantilist losses in exporting countries 
due to reduced exports, as well as welfare losses for importing countries (Yue, Beghin 
and Jensen, 2006).  In this article, this negative effect of SPS standards on international 
trade is called “COST-INCREASING EFFECT.”  Yet, product safety and sanitary 
standards can beneficially resolve imperfect information problems, and may stimulate 
consumers‟ demand by increasing their confidence in product safety and quality (Beghin 
and Bureau, 2001; Roberts, Josling and Orden, 1999; Thilmany and Barrett, 1997).  
Consumers desire a safe food supply and are willing to pay a premium for safer food 
(Baker, 1999; Buzby, Skees and Ready, 1995; Eom, 1994; Hayes, Jason, Shin et al., 1995; 
Misra, Huang and Ott, 1991).  However, consumers usually lack complete information 
about food safety.  Food safety standards can not only increase the food safety level 
provided by the market, but also help consumers make more informed purchasing 
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decisions.  Consumers would be more willing to buy food products that meet certain 
standards because they can get safer produce for their money spent (Unnevehr, 2000).  In 
such cases, food safety standards may improve food safety and enhance consumer 
demand for safer food products, which in turn can increase mercantilist gains in exporting 
countries and consumer welfare in importing countries. We call this positive impact of 
SPS standards on international trade “DEMAND-ENHANCING EFFECT.”   
Consequently, the direction of change in consumer welfare after imposing food 
safety standards in an importing country would depend on relative magnitudes of the 
standards‟ negative cost-increasing effect and positive demand-enhancing effect, 
whichever dominates.  Compliance with a standard involves additional costs such as 
human and financial capital investments, testing and detection, and higher rejection rates 
due to stricter standards.  Producers in exporting countries often transfer these costs to 
consumers by increasing product prices.  If regulatory standards do not resolve consumer 
uncertainty about imported product quality and safety, trade volume would decline due to 
increased prices and consumer welfare would decline in importing countries.  However, 
if regulatory standards increase consumer confidence in imported product quality and 
safety, stimulate demand, and the positive demand-enhancing effect of the standards is 
large enough to dominate the negative cost-increasing effect, then trade volume and 
consumer welfare would be greater than when the standards were not in place. Therefore, 
both the cost-increasing and demand-enhancing effects of food safety standards are key 
to understanding the changes of trade volume and consumer welfare of the importing 
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country after standards are implemented.  Ignoring the demand-enhancing effect of food 
safety standards could lead to biased estimations. 
Most of the existing literature on standards and regulations focus on their roles as 
non-tariff barriers and negative impacts on trade flow due to the cost-increasing effect 
without considering the demand-enhancing effect, which can greatly affect the trade flow 
and total welfare estimation results.  In this article, we extend the framework used by Yue, 
Beghin and Jensen (2006) and Liu and Yue (2009) by incorporating food safety 
standards‟ demand-enhancing effect and its interaction with the cost-increasing effect  in 
the analysis of trade flow and welfare changes caused by food safety standards.  The 
extended model is applied to investigate how the stricter European Union (EU)
1
 aflatoxin 
standards in the nut industry affect consumer confidence in product safety and quality, 
product prices, trade flow, and consumer welfare.  
Our article also contributes to the literature that evaluates the economic impact of 
food safety standards. The introduction of food safety standards is likely to affect product 
prices and quality, and ultimately consumer consumption patterns and overall welfare.  
Several studies have utilized conjoint analysis, contingent valuation, or experimental 
markets to measure consumer willingness to pay for specific safety attributes.  For 
example, Lin and Milon (1995) use contingent valuation to show that on average 
consumers would be willing to pay a premium of 18% to 20% for a dozen oysters with 
reduced risk levels.  Halbrendt, Pesek, Parsons et al. (1995) use conjoint analysis to 
assess consumer acceptance of genetically-engineered pST (porcine somatotropin)-
                                                 
1 EU refers to the European Union, which currently is a politico-economic union of 28 member states that are located primarily 
in Europe. 
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supplemented pork products in Australia. Experimental auction markets (Fox, Shogren, 
Hayes et al., 1995; Hayes, Jason, Shin et al., 1995) are also used to estimate customer 
willingness to pay for specific food safety attributes.  However, the results from those 
survey-based methods or auction markets might not reflect consumers‟ actual  
marketplace behavior because consumers‟ attitudes in surveys or experimental auctions 
sometimes differ from their actual actions (Caswell, 2002).  In this article, our model 
allows us to explicitly estimate consumer confidence changes due to stricter food safety 
standards. Using revealed price and consumption data, a more objective ex post valuation 
of how consumers respond to food safety standards is provided.  
Our empirical analysis results have important policy implications.  The number of 
trade disputes has been increasing between countries over SPS standards.  Therefore, 
understanding the trade impact of these standards is of great significance.  Our results 
suggest that removing SPS standards will not necessarily achieve sufficient consumer 
welfare gains to overcome losses from a reduced standard level. While scientific 
assessment of the human health risk associated with food safety should be considered in 
setting standards, the fact that the subjective assessment of food safety by consumers also 
plays an important role in consumer demand and the international trade flow should not 
be ignored. Our results suggest that in some cases, more stringent food safety standards 
can facilitate trade and increase consumer welfare, and that increased food safety 
standards and trade flow are likely to be compatible and even mutually reinforcing 
(Buzby and Unneveh, 2003).  
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Background Information  
In this section, we briefly present an overview of the EU nut market, EU aflatoxin 
standards, and previous studies on how EU aflatoxin standards affect EU nut imports.   
The EU Nuts Market 
In botany, a nut is a fruit composed of a hard shell and a seed and that the shell does 
not open to release the seed.  Common usage of the term is much less restrictive than in 
botany. It often refers to any hard-walled, edible kernel as a nut. There are two segments 
for edible nuts: groundnuts (peanuts) and tree nuts. Tree nuts include, but are not limited 
to, almonds, Brazil nuts, cashews, chestnuts, hazelnuts, macadamia nuts, pecans, 
pistachios, and walnuts. 
Consumption 
The consumption of nuts (including groundnuts and tree nuts) in the EU has shown 
an upward trend in recent years as more Europeans are turning to nuts as an alternative 
protein source and „healthy‟ snack (CBI, 2009).  Figure 1 shows how total and per capita 
EU nuts consumption (volume) changes over time. In 2011, the consumption of nuts in 
the EU was around 3.2 million tonnes.  Germany has the largest market, accounting for 
21% of total EU consumption in 2011, closely followed by Italy (18%), Spain (12%), 
France (11%) and the United Kingdom (8%). 
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Figure 1. EU consumption of edible nuts.   Source: FAOSTAT, 2015 
Germany consumed 642,133 tonnes of nuts in 2011. Groundnut is the most 
consumed nut in Germany. The other two most consumed nuts are almonds and hazelnuts. 
Consumption of pistachios and chestnuts is somewhat smaller
2
. A large variety of edible 
nuts is used as an ingredient for chocolate products in the German industrial sector. 
Germany is also a leading EU producer of marzipan, which has almond paste as the main 
component.  
Italy is also one of the leading nut consuming EU member states.  Italian 
consumption of edible nuts in 2011 amounted to 538,692 tonnes. Groundnuts, almonds, 
and hazelnuts are the largest consumed nuts in the country. 
Spanish consumption of edible nuts amounted to 349,203 tonnes in 2011.  Nuts are 
traditional ingredients in the Mediterranean cuisine, which has been heavily promoted as 
a particularly healthy diet.  As a result of the increased health awareness, edible nut 
                                                 
2 The consumption data from FAO is up to 2011. The detailed consumption data for each species of tree nuts is not 
available at the moment author accessed. The introduction about the consumption quantity of each species of tree nuts 
is from the CBI report (2009).  
EU nuts consumption 
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consumption has grown in Spain over the past several years. Almonds, groundnuts and 
walnuts are the leading products, followed by pistachios and hazelnuts.   
French consumption of edible nuts amounted to 329,534 tonnes in 2011. France is a 
leading EU consumer of edible nuts, particularly of walnuts. Walnuts consumption uses 
include snacking and home cooking, by-products consumption, such as walnut oil, and 
shelled walnuts used as ingredients in the pastry, bakery and cheese industries for 
example. The French market for snacking products has increased significantly over the 
past few years.  
Compared to other EU member countries, the United Kingdom is an average 
consumer of edible nuts, with groundnuts being the most popular item. Volume 
consumption of edible nuts in the United Kingdom amounted to 234,801 tonnes in 2011. 
The highly developed taste for Indian and other Asian cuisine in the UK has stimulated 
the demand for edible nuts, as ingredients in ethnic dishes and sauces. As in other EU 
member countries, British consumers show a preference for shelled nuts while, in-shell 
nuts, being a traditional Christmas food product, are popular during the Christmas period.  
Production 
EU countries produce substantial quantities of nuts.  In 2013, total nuts production in 
the EU amounted to around 740,926 tonnes.  Almond is, by far, the most produced nut, 
accounting for 35% of production in 2013. Other main varieties are walnuts (23% of EU 
production in 2013), hazelnuts (19%) and chestnuts (17%).  The EU produces relatively 
small amounts of groundnuts. Italy, Spain and Greece are the largest producers of nuts in 
the EU.  
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In 2013, Italy was the leading EU producer of edible nuts with a total of 250,923 
tonnes (34% of EU production in 2013). Almonds and hazelnuts are the leading product 
groups grown in Italy. Italy is the second largest hazelnuts producer in the world in 2013, 
just ahead the U.S. and behind Turkey. Italian farms that cultivate hazelnut trees have 
been increasingly improving their production techniques hence enhancing the average 
yield per hectare and maintaining the Italian competitiveness in the world market.  
In 2013, Spain was the second leading EU producer of edible nuts with a total of 
200,800 tonnes (27% of EU production in 2013), with almonds being, by far, the largest 
cultivated product group. Hazelnuts are the second leading nut product cultivated in 
Spain.  
Greece represents the third leading EU producer of edible nuts. In 2013, total edible 
nuts production amounted to 90,800 tonnes (12% of EU production in 2013). Greece is 
the EU‟s leading groundnut as well as pistachio producer. Due to its exceptional flavor, 
shapely form, and full kernel, the Greece pistachio has been identified by the European 
Commission as a Protected Origin Product, distinguishing it from all other pistachio 
varieties world-wide. 
France is also one of the leading EU producers of edible nuts, with total production 
amounting to 51,186 tonnes in 2013. France is the foremost EU producer of walnuts, with 
production mainly based in the south-western and south-eastern regions of France.  
Figure 2 shows how the EU nuts production changes over time. On the whole, production 
of edible nuts in the EU is quite stable (CBI, 2009). Table 1 shows the major EU 
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producers of each species of nuts. On the whole, production of edible nuts in the EU is 
quite stable (CBI, 2009) 
 
Figure 2. EU production of nuts.     Source: FAOSTAT, 2015 
Table 1. Major EU Producers by Item and Volume (tonnes) 
Item Country 2011 2012 2013 
Almonds 
Spain 208,800 211,700 149,000 
Italy 104,790 89,865 72,633 
Greece 29,800 29,000 29,900 
Chestnuts 
Italy 50,134 52,000 49,459 
Greece 21,500 28,700 29,900 
Portugal 18,271 19,100 24,700 
Groundnuts Greece 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Hazelnuts 
Italy 128,940 85,232 112,643 
Spain 17,590 14,600 15,300 
France 7,337 10,030 7,619 
Pistachios 
Greece 9,580 10,000 11,000 
Italy 3,079 2,850 3,202 
Walnuts 
France 38,314 36,476 33,716 
Romania 35,073 30,546 31,764 
Greece 29,800 24,200 18,800 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2015 
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Imports 
The EU is a net importer of nuts. In 2013, total nut imports by EU member countries 
amounted to 1.4 million tonnes.  Since 2002, imports have increased by an average 
annual rate of 17% in terms of value and 4% in volume. Germany was the leading EU 
importer of edible nuts in 2013, accounting for about 29% of the total import volume, 
followed by Italy (15%), Spain (13%), the United Kingdom (12%) and France (9%). 
Groundnuts are, by far, the leading edible nut products imported by EU member 
countries, accounting for around 46% of the total import volume in 2013. Other 
important products are almonds, accounting for 16% of total edible nut import volume in 
2013, hazelnuts (10%), and walnuts (6%).  Table 2 shows the leading suppliers to the 
major EU importers of edible nuts. Table 3 shows the leading suppliers of different nuts 
EU imported.  Figure 3 shows the trend of EU imports by nuts item and volume. Figure 4 
shows the trend of EU import price of edible nuts. 
Table 2. Leading suppliers to the top-5 EU importers of edible nuts, 2013, share in % of 
imported volume 
Importing 
country 
Import 
quantity of 
edible nuts 
(tonnes) 
Leading suppliers in 2013 
Germany 411,399 USA (31%) Argentina (18%) Turkey (11%) India 
(5%) 
Italy 220,016 USA (22%) Turkey (16%) Spain (11%) Argentina 
(6%) Chile (5%) France (5%) 
Spain 190,758 USA (53%) China (14%), France (6%)  
United 
Kingdom 
174,369 USA (21%) Argentina (14%) China (10%) 
Netherlands (7%) Nicaragua (7%) 
France 136,367 USA (22%) Argentina (14%) Turkey (12%) Spain 
(11%)  
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Total EU 1,397,588 USA (33%) Argentina (21%) Turkey (8%) China 
(7%)  
Source: COMTRADE, 2015 
 
Table 3. Leading suppliers of EU importers of edible nuts, 2013, share in % of imported volume 
Item Import quantity 
(tonnes) 
Leading suppliers in 2013 
Almonds 302,200 USA (68%), Spain (16%)  
Chestnuts 36,157 Italy (30%), Spain (22%) Portugal (14%) 
Groundnuts 724,794 Argentina (55%), China (14%)USA (7%) 
Brazil (4%)  
Hazelnuts 151,675 Turkey (63%) Georgia (9%) Italy (7%)  
Pistachios 101,992 USA (47%)  Iran (30%)  
Walnuts 130,836 USA (42%) France (19%) Chile (6%)   
Source: COMTRADE, 2015 
 
 
Figure 3. EU import volume of different species of nuts. Source: FAOSTAT, 2014 
 
EU Import Volume (tonnes) 
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Figure 4. EU-27 import price of nuts.  Source: FAOSTAT, 2015 
Foods safety standards related to edible nuts 
When exporting edible nuts to the European Union, the following food safety 
legislative requirements are relevant(CBI, 2005)
3
:  
1) General Food Law  
2) Aflatoxin levels  
3) Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) 
General Food Law  
In 2002, regulation EC 178/2002 has been adopted, laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food legislation and procedures in matters of food safety. 
                                                 
3 We only list the compulsory standard related to food safety issue. Some regulation such as packaging and 
labeling are not listed here.  
EU import price ($/kg) 
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The regulation is commonly known as the General Food Law, which prohibits the placing 
of unsafe food on the EU market. Food imported into the EU must comply with the 
relevant requirements of the general food law.  
Aflatoxin levels  
The most important food safety issue related to nuts is the possibility of aflatoxin 
contamination.  In general, the main European quality requirements for edible nuts are 
maximum levels of aflatoxins. Aflatoxins, a subcategory of mycotoxins, are toxic 
chemicals that appear in the food chain as a result of fungal infection. High humidity 
which are conducive to proliferation of mould and development of aflatoxins should be 
avoided, particularly during storage.  Aflatoxins are highly resistant to decomposition, 
temperature treatments (cooking and freezing), or being broken down in digestion.  Food 
contaminated with aflatoxins can cause short-term and long-term adverse health effects, 
ranging from headaches, fatigue, skin irritations and organ damage to increased cancer 
risk from longer term exposure.  At least 13 different types of aflatoxins are produced in 
nature and consist primarily of aflatoxins B1, B2, G1, G2 and M1.  Aflatoxin B1 is 
considered the most toxic and has been directly correlated to adverse health effects, such 
as liver cancer, in many animal species. Crops which are frequently affected include 
cereals (maize, sorghum, pearl millet, rice and wheat), oilseeds (peanut, soybean, 
sunflower and cotton), spices (chilli peppers, black pepper, coriander, turmeric and 
ginger), and nuts (groundnuts and tree nuts).  Aflatoxins were first discovered in England 
in 1960 when more than 100,000 turkeys and ducks died within a few months. In 1974, in 
northwest India, 108 people reportedly died from consuming aflatoxin-contaminated corn.  
  14 
In 2004, 125 Kenyan people died and nearly 200 others were treated after eating 
aflatoxin-contaminated maize. 
Since the discovery of aflatoxins in the 1960s, regulations have been established in 
many countries to protect consumers from aflatoxin-related health risks. The United 
States began regulating the concentration of aflatoxins in food and feed in 1968.  Now at 
least 77 countries have regulations for aflatoxins, but the stringency of standards in these 
countries varies widely from 0 parts per billion (ppb) to 35 ppb (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2004). In the U.S., the maximum allowable concentration of total 
aflatoxins (sum of the aflatoxins B1, B2, G1 and G2) in foodstuffs is 20 ppb.  The 
Canadian and Australian limits for total aflatoxins in nuts and nut-related products are 15 
ppb.  The Codex established a level of 15 ppb for total aflatoxins in food.   
Until 1998, members of the EU implemented different standards for aflatoxins in 
foodstuffs.  In 1997, the European Commission (European Commission, 1997) proposed 
new harmonized standards for total aflatoxins in food products which were finally 
enacted in 2002 (European Commission, 2001a).  The new standards established a 
maximum allowable level of 4 ppb (2 ppb for Aflatoxin B1) of total aflatoxins in cereals, 
edible nuts, and dried and preserved fruits.  The level represented stricter standards than 
the standards in most EU countries (although some country such as Austria had stricter 
aflatoxin standards than the harmonized standards), and was considerably lower than 
Codex recommendations and standards in many developing countries. For example, the 
new maximum allowable level of total aflatoxins in food was more than 50% lower than 
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the original standards of eight EU members (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden).  
The EU‟s harmonized regulations for aflatoxins in food also include stricter 
sampling procedures and criteria for methods of analysis. The regulation requires that 
three 10kg samples must be taken and analyzed. The total aflatoxins content of any of the 
samples cannot exceed 4 ppb for total aflatoxins or 2 ppb for aflatoxin B1. If higher 
levels are found in any sample, the whole consignment is rejected.  This leads to higher 
compliance costs and rejection rates of imports at the border. For example, complying 
with the new EU sampling method was estimated to result in an additional $150 cost per 
lot (a lot contains on average 16 tons) for peanut producers in USA (National Peanut 
Council of America, 1997). 
A number of trade partners expressed concerns about the new EU aflatoxin standards 
to the WTO.  For example, Peru emphasized that the new standards constituted an 
unjustifiable trade barrier and a violation of the WTO Agreement on SPS standards. India 
stated that the new regulations were unrealistic and impractical, and led to creation of 
non-tariff trade barriers. Thailand requested that the EU assist developing countries to 
comply with the new regulations. 
On 26 February 2010, the European Union (EU) published Commission Regulation 
No. 165/2010 amending Commission Regulation No. 1881/2006 to increase the 
maximum aflatoxin levels for almonds and pistachios as well as apricot kernels, 
hazelnuts and Brazil nuts. For other tree nuts, maximum EU aflatoxin levels remain 
unchanged. Maximum limits on groundnuts, dried fruits, milk, spices, baby and infant 
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foods remain unchanged. For example, the maximum EU levels of total aflatoxin for 
ready-to eat almonds, pistachios, hazelnuts and Brazil increased from 4 to 10ppb and 
increased from 10 to 15ppb for those nuts for further processing. 
Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs)  
Imports of edible nuts to the EU have to comply with the legislation for Maximum 
Residue Levels (MRLs) of a large number of pesticides. The maximum limits for 
pesticide residues in and on certain products of plant origin, including edible nuts, are 
laid down in Regulation (EC) No. 396/2005. In establishing a MRL, the EU takes into 
account GAP (good agricultural practices) recommendations, data on consumer residue 
intake, physico-chemical and biological properties of the chemical.  
Previous Studies on EU Aflatoxin Standards 
The EU‟s adoption of stricter harmonized standards for aflatoxins has been 
frequently cited as an example of how standards that exceed international standards 
requirement serve as “trade barriers” and result in large losses for exporting countries.  It 
has been argued that stricter standards would impose serious costs or technical difficulties 
on the suppliers.  Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001b) employ
 
a gravity model to 
estimate the impact of the implementation of the new aflatoxin standards in the EU on the 
changes in trade flow of groundnut products using trade data from Europe and Africa 
during 1989–1998.  Their results suggest that the new EU regulations on aflatoxins would 
result in a trade flow that
 
is 63% lower than when the Codex Alimentarius international
 
standards were followed.  A later article (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh, 2001a) extends 
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the analysis by broadening the product to cereal, edible nuts, and dried and preserved 
fruits, based on trade and regulatory survey data for 15 European countries and 9 African 
countries between 1989 and 1998.  Their results suggest that African export revenue from 
the 15 European countries would likely decrease by 59% for cereals and 47% for dried 
and preserved fruits and edible nuts. The total loss is estimated to be nearly $400 million 
for cereals, dried and preserved fruits, and nuts under the Commission‟s new standards.   
After six years of the implementation of EU harmonized aflatoxin standards, a new 
report from the World Bank (Rios and Jaffee, 2008) re-examines the effects of EU 
aflatoxin standards on edible groundnut exports from Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
conclusions of this article differ sharply from the “standards as barriers” hypothesis.  It 
argues that the “lost” trade, which is attributed to the EU standards, is very low and the 
aggregate effects of the new EU regulation, in terms of intercepted trade, are small and 
vastly overstated by prior research.   
Similarly, our article re-examines the impact of EU harmonized aflatoxin standards.   
In addition to estimating their impact on trade flow due to increased costs associated with 
complying with the standards, we take into account the standards‟ impact on consumer 
confidence in food safety.  
Analytical Framework 
In this section, we start with the introduction of a general model, then narrow down 
to the specific model and estimations of this article. In next section, we will apply the 
specific model to the sample data and discuss the estimation results.   
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The Basic Set-up 
To gauge the impact of the EU harmonized aflatoxins standards on prices, trade 
flows, and consumer welfare, we start with a graphical illustration.  First, we consider the 
cost-increasing effect in a small country case, supposing that domestic goods and 
imported goods are homogeneous.  Compliance with this regulation is assumed to 
involve a cost C. The cost-increasing effect acts like a tariff on the quantity of trade (but 
without tariff revenue). Figure 5 shows the impacts of the cost-increasing effect on 
domestic market and world market.  We will use price-wedge method to estimate the 
cost-increasing effect in this article. The left diagram in figure 5 shows upward-sloping 
supply and downward-sloping demand for a good inside a country. The world price, PW, 
is assumed to be below the country's autarky price, so that it has excess demand at the 
world price and will import the good if it is free to do so. The impacts of the standard on 
the domestic market depend on whether the standard induces any change in the world 
price. In the small-country case, the country's imports are too small to matter for the 
world market and the world price remains unchanged.  If the importing country is large, 
however, its reduced demand for imports causes the world price to fall.  In the small-
country case, the world price remains unchanged, and therefore the domestic price must 
rise by the full amount of the cost of compliance C. This rise in price causes domestic 
supply to rise and domestic demand to fall, along the respective supply and demand 
curves. Since the quantity of imports is the difference between demand and supply, 
imports are reduced by both of these changes. 
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Figure 5.  Cost-increasing effect in a small country case 
As in figure 5, at price PW, the quantity demanded is QD1, the quantity supplied by 
domestic producers is QS1, and the difference between these two amounts is the quantity 
imported (QD1- QS1 in the left diagram and M1 in the right diagram). When this importer 
(a small country) alone adopts a universal SPS regulation, the price in the importing 
country increases by the cost of compliance C. In this scenario, imports fall to M2 (QD2- 
QS2 in the left hand panel), which is also the intersection of the excess demand curve ED 
and the new compliance cost-inclusive product price PW+ C (world supply curve shift 
from SW1 to SW2).  Consumer surplus also falls, by the area A + B + C + D, while 
producer surplus increases by A. The regulation therefore results in net welfare losses (or 
a reduction in the gains from trade relative to the free trade equilibrium at the intersection 
of ED and PW) equal to the area E + F. 
Domestic market 
F D C B 
Pw+C 
Pw 
Price 
Price 
Quantity Quantity 
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ED 
QS
1 
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As discussed earlier, the demand-enhancing effect would increase consumer‟s 
demand through increased confidence in product safety and quality, and therefore shifts 
outward the demand curve. When the cost-increasing effect and demand-enhancing effect 
are jointly in place, the net welfare effect of the SPS standard (versus trade without the 
regulation) is ambiguous, depending on whether the consumer benefits from the 
information are greater than the cost of compliance. Figure 6 shows the impacts of SPS 
standard when considering both the cost-increasing and demand-enhancing effect in a 
small country case. 
Figure 6. Cost-increasing and demand-enhancing effect in a small country case 
As in figure 6, without the demand-enhancing effect, original demand curve is D1, 
corresponding to the import demand curve ED1 that is derived from domestic demand D1 
and supply S. Trade flow is given by M1, derived from ED1and world supply SW1. SPS 
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standard‟s demand enhancing effect raises the demand to D2, but incurs the cost of 
compliance C, which raises the domestic price in the importing country to PW+ C. This 
leads to trade of M2, which can be above or below M1. The domestic supply curve does 
not shift, as the regulation does not change the cost of domestic production. The gains 
from trade are now unambiguously larger (area A + B) than if the compliance costs had 
been borne with no shift in demand (area A). 
Next, we relax the small country assumption. If a country changes the world price by 
its decision to adopt a SPS standard that affects the quantity of the product it imports, or 
if importers uniformly impose a barrier against all exporters, then the small country 
assumption is not appropriate. Considering only the cost-increasing effect in a large 
country case, the cost-increasing effect would reduce import demand of a country of any 
size from the world market. This reduced demand from the world market, if the country 
is large enough to matter at all, causes the world price to fall. The fall in world price 
implies that the domestic price rises by less than the cost of compliance C. Qualitatively, 
the rising domestic price has the same effects on domestic suppliers and demanders as in 
the small-country case, but quantitatively both the gain to suppliers and the loss to 
demanders are reduced, since the price increase is smaller.  When there is demand-
enhancing effect besides cost-increasing effect, the impacts on world price, trade flow, 
and consumer welfare are ambiguous.  
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Figure 7. Cost-increasing effect and demand-enhancing effect in a large country case 
For example, as shown in figure 7, in a large country case, the cost-increasing effect 
would shift the world supply curve from SW1 to SW2. The demand-enhancing effect would 
shift the excessive demand curve from ED1 to ED2. If the demand-enhancing effect 
dominates, the world price would increase from PW to PW‟, trade flow would increase 
from M1 to M2, and domestic consumer surplus would decrease compared to the small 
country case. If the demand-enhancing effect is large enough, the world price would 
increase, the trade flow would increase, domestic consumer surplus would decrease 
compared to the small country case. If the cost-increasing effect dominates the demand-
enhancing effect, the world price would decrease, trade flow would decrease, and 
domestic consumer surplus would be larger than the small country case. The domestic 
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supply curve does not shift, as the regulation does not change the cost of domestic 
production.  
Measuring the cost-increasing effect--The price-wedge method 
In order to measure the cost-increasing effect, which is the cost of compliance C 
discussed in figures of last section, we use a price-wedge method. Price-wedge methods 
rely on the idea that NTBs can be gauged in terms of their impact on the product price in 
comparison to a reference price. The price wedge is estimated by comparing the price 
that would prevail without the NTB to the price that would prevail in the presence of the 
NTB if the price paid to suppliers were to remain unchanged (Deardorff and Stern, 1998). 
The estimate of the price wedge can be used as an input in a partial or a general 
equilibrium welfare effect of NTBs.  
The price wedge is the difference between the nuts price exported to EU market PEU 
and the export price to Non-EU market PNon-EU. The price wedge is divided into the cost 
of complying with the EU aflatoxin standard and other factors
4
.  
(1)  Price Wedge EU Non EU SPS other factorsP P Cost v     
where PEU is the average Free on Board (FOB) price of nuts exported to EU market; 
PNon-EU is the average FOB price of the same species of nuts to Non-EU countries; vother 
factors measures the price difference caused by other factors rather than aflatoxin standards 
of EU, such as other EU food safety standards and packing and labeling requirements; 
CostSPS  measures all the average cost incurred by complying with the aflatoxin standards 
                                                 
4. EU aflatoxin standard also leads to higher rejection rate after landed, but the percentage is quite small 
(Rios and Jaffee, 2008), so we ingore this part of cost. 
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of EU compared to Non-EU markets. CostSPS exists before and after the harmonization of 
EU aflatoxin standard but could be different since the aflatoxin standards in EU became 
stricter in 2002. To measure the cost-increasing effect of the EU‟s adoption of stricter 
harmonized standards for aflatoxins in 2002, we measure how the price wedge change 
due to standards. As shown in equation (1), we need to consider other factors that 
contribute to the price wedge and change over time. For example, some big events that 
just affect the export price to EU market happened some year will contribute to the price 
wedge.  Referring to literature (CBI, 2009; USDA, 2012) about the EU nuts market, as 
far as we know, there are no big events before and after 2002 during our sample period 
that might affect the price of nuts and thus contribute to the estimated price wedge over 
time. So, assuming other factors remain unchanged, equation (2) is estimated to measure 
the cost-increasing effect.  
(2)               
       price wedge    
(adjusted for inflation) 0= i i i i
i i
a b item c item SPS u        
SPS is a dummy variable that equals to 0 before 2002 and 1 after.  Itemi is indicator 
variable for nut i. We add this variable considering the cost-increasing effect could be 
different for different nuts. Estimated parameters ci measures the cost-increasing effect of 
the standard for nut i. Considering other factors that contribute to the price wedge such as 
inflation may change over time, we use the GDP deflator to convert current value to real 
dollar value.  
Calvin and Krissoff (1998) estimated the tariff rate equivalents of the technical 
regulations in the apple sector. In order to do so, they compared Cost, Insurance and 
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Freight (CIF) prices (landed prices including freight and insurance costs) of U.S. apples 
in a foreign country with wholesale prices in the foreign market. They assumed that the 
price gap consists of the tariff and technical barrier tariff rate equivalent. This approach 
was also used in a study by the European Commission which compared monthly CIF 
prices of U.S. pig and poultry meat with their wholesale price in the EU market 
(European Commission, 2001b). The difference in price between the U.S. product and the 
wholesale price of the comparable product was calculated as the price wedge in 
percentage terms.  
Measuring the demand-enhancing effect 
Further, we relax the homogeneous commodity assumption. To incorporate the 
heterogeneity of goods in consumers‟ preferences, we employ a CES model that is 
similar to Yue, Beghin and Jensen (2006) and Liu and Yue (2009). We introduce possible 
changes in the consumer confidence in product safety due to stricter standards to the 
basic CES utility function that incorporates the heterogeneity in consumer‟s preference 
for EU (hereafter referred to as “domestic”) and imported nuts. Domestic and imported 
nut quantities are defined as D and I, respectively.  A representative consumer maximizes 
the following utility function, subject to a budget constraint:  
(3)      
, 
1
( , ) (1 )
D I
MaxU D I D I AOG
       
 
         s.t.     D I TP D P I AOG M    
MT is the expenditure on all goods; ρ = 1–1/ σ, with σ measuring the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and imported nuts; PI and PD are prices of imported and 
domestic nuts, respectively; AOG is the aggregate numéraire good; α and 1- α are 
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indicators of consumer confidence in domestic and imported nuts, respectively. They 
capture consumer confidence in product safety and quality, and the combination of all 
product characteristics other than price of a product. The indirect utility function is  
(4)  
1
1 1 1( , , ) ( *) 1D I T D IV P P M M AOG P P
          
 
 
and the corresponding expenditure function is  
(5) 
1
1 1 1( , , ) ( *) (1 )D I D Ie P P u u AOG P P
              
The expenditure function and indirect utility function are used to estimate consumer 
welfare. The associated Marshallian demand functions are 
(6) 
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These demand functions are used to estimate the new equilibrium quantities of 
imported and domestic nuts if the stricter standards were removed.  
The marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative price of the substitute goods 
or 
(8) 
D D
I I
MU P
MRS
MU P
   
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where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution, and MUI and MUD are the marginal utility 
of imported and domestic nuts, respectively.  MRS is calculated from (3) and then 
substituted back into (8) and result in 
(9) 
1
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To estimate the parameters, we rearrange equation (9) and take natural logarithm to 
obtain  
(10) ln ln( ) ln
1
I
D
PD
I P

 

   
     
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To measure the demand-enhancing effect of stricter food safety standards, we assume 
that the ratio α/(1- α) is a function of SPS, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
the stricter harmonized EU standards are in place, and 0 otherwise.  We also consider 
other factors that may affect consumer demand over time such as GDP, exchange rate, 
and population.  Some trade models such as gravity model also consider factors such as 
distance between importing and exporting countries, common languages between import 
and export countries, etc.  Since these variables do not typically change over a short 
period of time, we do not consider how these variables might affect consumer demand 
over time in our model.  Specifically, we assume that  
(11) 0
1 2 3 4
0
( ) exp(  )
1 1
SPS GDP Exchange Rate Population

   
 
        
 
 
β1 measure changes in the relative consumer confidence in domestic and imported nuts 
due to stricter standards. It captures the demand-enhancing effect of SPS standards. If it is 
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positive, it means that the stricter standards increase consumer confidence in domestic 
products more than in imported products; if it is negative, it means the stricter standards 
increase consumer confidence in imported products more than in domestic products. α0 
and 1- α0 are consumer confidence in domestic and imported products. β2 measures the 
impact of GDP on consumer confidence in imported and domestic products. β3 measures 
the impact of exchange rate on consumer confidence in imported and domestic products. 
β4 measures the impact of population on consumer confidence in imported and domestic 
products. Substitute equation (11) into (10), we get  
 (12)      
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0
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We regress the left-hand side of equation (12) on ln(PI /PD) , SPS, GDP, exchange 
rate, population, and use the regression coefficients to recover parameters σ, α0, β1, β2, β3 
and β4.  The parameters‟ standard deviations are derived using the Delta method.   
Estimating the impact of a change in EU aflatoxin standard on prices, trade flows, and 
welfare. 
We conduct comparative statics to estimate the impact of a change in SPS standard 
on prices, trade flows, and welfare by assuming how the prices, trade flows, and 
consumer welfare changes if the SPS standard were removed while other things remain 
unchanged.   
Under the small country assumption, if the EU aflatoxin standard was removed, the 
price of imported nuts would decrease by the full amount of cost of compliance since the 
world price is not affected by the standards.  EU is assumed to be a small country in this 
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analysis.  Magee and Magee (2008) argue that being the largest country in world trade 
with 17% of world imports, the United States is a small country in world trade in that its 
trade policies have negligible impacts on world prices. Bradburd and Over (1982) report 
critical values of concentration of 50%-60% to be able to influence market prices. The 
U.S. courts have adopted a 50% market share as ability to control prices in a market 
(Cameron and Glick, 1998). The total EU import volume of the six species of nuts is 
around 23% of world import volume. Since 23% is comparable to the US share of 17% as 
in Magee and Magee (2008) and below the critical value of 50% reported in Bradburd 
and Over (1982) and Cameron and Glick (1998), So we assume that EU is a small 
country in the nuts trade market. 
Then we can derive the new imported price PI.  Let S be the supply of EU domestic 
nuts (excluding the exports), which is an increasing function of the price of domestic nuts 
and exogenous parameter γ 
(13) ( , ) SD DS P P
   
Parameter εs represents the own-price elasticity of the domestic nut supply.  Equilibrium 
domestic price e
DP  and quantity D are determined by the market equilibrium condition: 
(14) ( , ) ( , )e eD I DD P P S P   
By substituting equation (6) into the left-hand side of equation (14), which is a 
function of 
e
DP ,and substituting equation (13) into the right-side of equation (14), which 
is also a function of 
e
DP , we can get equation (15) with unknown variable 
e
DP .  
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All the other variables are known, so solving for eDP  in equation (15), one can derive 
the new equilibrium domestic price eDP . Substitute new PD (
e
DP ) and new PI into equation 
(6), we can get new quantity D after the removal of standards.   
After get the new PI and PD, we substitute back into equation (7) to get the new 
import quantity.  Compare the new import quantity to the old one, we can learn how the 
trade flow changes. For the welfare analysis, the Equivalent Variation (EV) is used to 
measure consumer welfare change, with 0 1 0( , ) ,EV e P u m  where ( , )D IP P P and 
subscripts 0 and 1 indicate initial and new prices, respectively. 0 1( , )e P u is estimated by 
equation (5). Equivalent variation (EV) is a measure of welfare change by estimating how 
much more money a consumer would pay before a price increase to avert the price 
increase. We can learn from this estimation how EU consumer welfare changes.  
In the next section, we will apply the framework introduced above to the data we 
collected and discuss the results. First, we estimate the cost-increasing effect (cost of 
compliance C). The estimation results will be used to estimate the new PI supposing the 
standards were removed. That is, if the standards were removed, we suppose the PI would 
decrease by C. Then we use equation (12) to estimate the demand-enhancing effect and 
other parameters. From this estimation, we can learn if there is demand-enhancing effect 
or not (whether parameter α changes). After obtain the estimates of cost-increasing effect 
and demand-enhancing effect, we proceed to estimate how the trade flows and consumer 
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welfare would change if the standard were removed. By equation (15), we get new PD. 
Using new PI, PD, and new parameter α (if there is demand-enhancing effect, α would 
change), along with estimates of other parameters, we can calculate the new trade flow by 
equation (7) and new consumer welfare by  Equivalent Variation (EV) method introduced 
above.  
Empirical Analysis 
Data 
We apply the framework developed in the analytical framework section to the EU 
aflatoxin standards harmonization case.  Products included in this analysis are almonds, 
chestnuts, groundnuts, hazelnuts, pistachios and walnuts. We use data for the time period 
between 1991 and 2009. Trade, consumption and price data from 9 European countries 
are used in the analysis. They are obtained from FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2015). We include those countries whose corresponding data are available 
and those countries whose pre-harmonized standards were not as strict as the EU 
harmonized aflatoxin standards. The European countries included in this article are 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Hungary joined the EU after 2002. However, they implemented the 
harmonized EU aflatoxin standards in 2002 as candidate EU countries. So we include 
those countries in our estimation. Those countries are included both before and after 2002 
like all other countries that without standard before 2002 and with standard after 2002. So, 
we argue that this should not affect the results. Our dataset is disaggregated by country 
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(not aggregated as EU). For each country and each nut, domestic production minus 
exports (consumption of domestic supplied products) is used to estimate D and the 
producer price is used to estimate PD.  The total import quantity for each nut product 
from around the world is utilized to estimate I. The weighted average CIF price is used to 
estimate PI.  Since the harmonized EU aflatoxin standards came into force in 2002, the 
dummy variable SPS equals 0 between 1991 and 2001 and 1 between 2002 and 2009. 
Data to calculate PEU  and  PNon-EU is obtained from COMTRADE database, where PEU is 
the average FOB price of nuts exported to EU market; PNon-EU is the average FOB price 
of the same species of nuts to Non-EU countries.  
Estimation results 
Cost-increasing effect  
To estimate the cost-increasing effect of the aflatoxin standards, we first calculate the 
price wedge between the export price of each nut to EU market and Non-EU markets 
during our sample period 1991-2009. Then we pooled those data and run an OLS 
regression on equation (2) and estimated parameters ci measures the cost-increasing 
effect of the standard for nut i. We then calculate the weighted average   of the six 
nuts ($341.41/tonne), where si is average share of imports of nut i during 2002-2009. 
Estimation results are listed in table 4. The estimation results of cost of compliance for 
groundnuts and almonds are smaller than those for other four nuts. This may due to the 
economies of scale that groundnuts and almonds are the largest two traded nuts in terms 
of volume. Economies of scale are the cost advantages that enterprises obtain due to size, 
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throughput, or scale of operation, with cost per unit of output generally decreasing with 
increasing scale as fixed costs are spread out over more units of output (incremental 
production). 
Table 4. Cost-increasing effect of EU aflatoxin standard in 2002 
Item Estimated value Standard Error Import Share (average 
value 2002-2009) 
Almond 205.29** 84.67 20.20% 
Chestnut 633.92*** 148.14 2.84% 
Groundnut 284.40*** 58.97 46.08% 
Hazelnut 563.07*** 84.14 11.83% 
Pistachio 406.80*** 112.90 10.03% 
Walnut 484.56*** 101.56 9.02% 
Weighted 
Average 
341.41***    36.84  
Demand-enhancing effect 
We run two stage least square regression (2SLS) on (12) since the right hand side 
variable ln(PI/PD) is endogenously determined. The instruments we use are wage index, 
price index of total agricultural inputs, and year dummy variables. The estimated results 
for σ and consumer confidence indicator parameters are shown in table 5.  As shown in 
equation (11), the coefficient β1 of dummy variable SPS in our model captures the change 
in consumer preference in imported and domestic nuts (
1


) associated with the 
implementation of EU aflatoxin standards. The coefficient β1 for dummy variable SPS is 
significant and negative, which indicates that the implementation of the stricter 
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harmonized EU aflatoxin standards has significantly increased consumer‟s preference for 
imported nuts relative to domestic nuts.  This is consistent with the fact that consumers in 
the EU want to make more informed purchasing and consumption decisions. Variety, 
convenience, nutrition and health are important factors for making purchase decisions. 
These factors have an impact on the consumption of edible nuts (USDA, 2012). 
The coefficient β2 is positive and significant.  GDP measures the economy of a 
country. Usually the higher the GDP, the more developed the country is. The positive 
sign of β2 means that the more developed a country is, the consumers in that country like 
the domestic products more. The coefficient β4 is negative and significant. It means that 
the more population a country has, the country would more like imported products.  
Table 5. Estimated parameters of elasticity of substitution and consumer preference 
Parameter Estimated Value Approximate Standard Deviation 
σ 1.15*** 0.19 
β1 (SPS) -0.90*** 0.25 
β2 (GDP) 1.95** 0.82 
β3 (Exchange Rate) 0.015 0.017 
β4 (Population) -0.06*** 0.02 
α0 0.74*** 0.07 
Note:  *** means the coefficient is significant at 1%, ** means the coefficient is significant at 5%, *means the 
coefficient is significant at 10%.  Number of observations: 332.  Wald chi2(5)  = 71.17,   Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
Trade flow and welfare changes 
Compliance costs and costs associated with higher rejection rate due to the EU 
aflatoxin standards increase the import prices of nuts. If the higher standards do not 
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resolve consumer uncertainty about product quality and safety, the trade volume and 
consumer welfare would decline.  Furthermore, the net welfare often decreases compared 
to before the implementation of the stricter standards.  This explains why SPS standards 
are often considered a barrier or protectionist tool. However, if the regulatory standards 
of imports resolve consumer uncertainty about product quality and safety, thereby 
stimulating demand, and if the standards‟ demand-enhancing effect is sufficiently large, 
then the trade volume and consumer welfare could be greater than under unregulated 
trade. This implies that exporting countries may benefit through the demand-enhancing 
regulatory standards imposed by the EU.  
In this section, we analyze the impact of the stricter harmonized EU aflatoxin 
standards on EU nut imports, EU domestic consumer welfare, and EU nut producer 
surplus.  The welfare analysis is conducted by estimating the impact on welfare if the 
standards were removed while the other factors remain unchanged.  If the stricter EU 
aflatoxin standards were removed, price of imported nuts PI would decrease by the cost 
of compliance (estimated in previous section). However, if the standards were removed, 
consumer confidence in imported nuts would also decrease, since the analysis indicates 
stricter EU aflatoxin standards are demand-enhancing and increase consumer confidence 
in the safety and quality of imported nuts.  Decreased import prices have a positive effect 
on import quantity demanded and consumer welfare.  Conversely, decreased consumer 
confidence in imported nuts has a negative effect on import quantity and consumer 
welfare. Therefore, how the trade volume and consumer welfare would change after the 
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removal of the EU higher aflatoxin standards is ambiguous and depends on the 
interaction between the demand-enhancing effect and cost-increasing effect.  
For EU domestic nut producers, the supply function is specified in equation (13). 
The supply elasticity of almond is around 0.97, and that of walnut is around 0.74 (Russo, 
Green and Howitt, 2008).  The average, 0.85, is used as the supply elasticity in the 
following welfare analysis. The consumer welfare changes of 9 EU countries between 
2007 and 2009 with the removal of the stricter harmonized EU aflatoxin standards are 
estimated.  Estimation method is introduced in the analytical framework. The results of 
the welfare analysis are shown in table 6.   
Table 6. Import and Welfare Changes with Elimination of EU Aflatoxin Standards*   
Year 
Changes in 
Import (tonnes) 
EV ($) 
Changes in 
Producer Surplus 
($) 
2007 -170,139 (-18.33%) -463,607,950    745,366,692  
2008 -165,765 (-17.97%) -589,667,533     897,222,655  
2009 -163,175 (-17.47%) -433,674,567     787,300,151  
*Note: The results are for the 9 sample EU countries in our analysis rather than the whole EU. 
The results show that for all of the years from 2007 to 2009, if the harmonized EU 
aflatoxin standards were removed, the imported quantity of nuts would decrease, the EU 
consumer would be worse off, the EU nut producers would be better off.  For example, 
for year 2009, if the EU aflatoxin standards were removed, the nut imports of those 9 EU 
countries would decrease by 163,175 tonnes (around 17.5%) and the consumer welfare 
would decrease by $433 million, which is contrary to the findings from previous studies 
showing that the implementation of the stricter EU standards would decrease imports 
(Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh, 2001a, b). Because the cost-increasing effect would 
restrict trade and decrease consumer welfare and demand-enhancing effect would 
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promote trade and increase consumer welfare, the results of the welfare analysis that 
removing the aflatoxin standards would decrease trade flow and consumer welfare  
indicate that in this case of stricter aflatoxin standards, the demand-enhancing effect of 
stricter food safety standards dominates its cost-increasing effect, resulting in increasing 
exporting and importing countries‟ consumer welfare.  
One important contribution of our article is that both the demand-enhancing effect 
and cost-increasing effect of food safety standards are considered in the import and 
welfare estimations.  So we compare the results to the situation when only considering 
the cost-increasing effect and when only considering the demand-enhancing effect. Table 
7 shows the import and welfare changes when only the cost-increasing effect is 
considered. That is we suppose if the standard were removed, the imported price PI would 
decrease by the cost of compliance C, but the parameter α and 1-α remain unchanged. 
Table 8 shows the import and welfare changes when only considering the demand-
enhancing effect. That is we suppose if the standard were removed, the import price 
would remain unchanged, but the parameter α would increase (1-α would decrease).  
Table 7. Import and Welfare Changes with Elimination of EU Aflatoxin Standards* 
(Only consider the cost-increasing effect) 
Year 
Changes in 
Import (tonnes) 
EV ($) 
Changes in 
Producer Surplus 
($) 
2007 91,724 (9.88%) 360,883,713 -56,569,869 
2008 92,860 (10.06%) 321,851,970 -35,941,829 
2009 108,243 (11.59%) 333,567,271 -31,273,000 
*Note: The results are for the 9 sample EU countries in our analysis rather than the whole EU. 
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Table 8. Import and Welfare Changes with Elimination of EU Aflatoxin 
Standards*(Only consider the demand-enhancing effect) 
Year 
Changes in 
Import (tonnes) 
EV ($) 
Changes in 
Producer Surplus 
($) 
2007 -242,001 (-26.08%) -677,607,945 797,020,103 
2008 -230,787 (-25.01%) -771,584,258 924,644,981 
2009 -235,991 (-25.27%) -642,668,784 870,486,916 
*Note: The results are for the 9 sample EU countries in our analysis rather than the whole EU. 
As shown in table 7, without considering the demand-enhancing effect, the 
estimation results are opposite to the results considering the demand-enhancing effect. 
That is the stricter EU aflatoxin standards would impede imports, which is similar to 
findings from previous studies (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh, 2001a, b). Also, consumer 
welfare is decreased by implementing the stricter standards. The notable change in results 
suggests that when the demand-enhancing effect of the standards is ignored, the negative 
impact of SPS standards is overestimated. These results show that it is very important to 
consider the impact of SPS standards on consumer confidence in food safety, and 
ignoring it could lead to biased estimations of imports and welfare changes. 
Our comparative statics analysis replies on the assumption that EU is a small country. 
If this assumption is relaxed, our estimation results may be biased. For example, if the 
demand-enhancing effect dominates, then the new PI would be over-estimated, and new 
equilibrium price PD would also be over-estimated. Consumer welfare change would be 
over-estimated. 
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Conclusion 
Product safety has become an increasing concern in many countries. Consumers 
desire a safe food supply and are willing to pay a premium for safer food, and thus many 
governments have established food safety standards. Standards are designed to facilitate 
information exchange, ensure quality, and achieve the provision of public goods. In 
particular, SPS standards can improve human health and quality of life.  SPS standards 
can also improve information symmetry between suppliers and consumers about safety 
and quality of products, thereby facilitating market transactions and expand export 
opportunities (Wilson, 2001).  However, standards can also be used for merely protection 
purposes in practice. For example, SPS standards may discriminate against foreign 
suppliers or help domestic firms gain strategic trade advantages over foreign competitors. 
Unnecessary standards could impose excessive costs on consumers and reduce net social 
welfare.   
Both the standards that resolve information-based market failures (e.g. standards that 
resolve consumer uncertainty with food safety) and the standards that merely protect 
domestic producers have the same cost-increasing effect on international trade (i.e. 
increase the import price). However, the former may increase consumer welfare, and the 
later could reduce consumer welfare.  In this article, we extend the framework used by 
Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006) and Liu and Yue (2009) to incorporate the stricter food 
safety standards‟ demand-enhancing effect, and its interaction with cost-increasing effect 
in trade flow and welfare analysis.  The extended model is applied to investigate how the 
stricter harmonized EU aflatoxin standards in nut industry affect consumer confidence in 
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product safety and quality, imported price and quantity, and consumer welfare.  Our 
results reveal that while the stricter standards increase production and trade costs and lead 
to higher import prices, they also significantly increase the consumer confidence in the 
imported nuts, and increase the trade and consumer welfare the importing countries.   
Most of the existing literature on food safety standards emphasizes standards‟ roles 
as non-tariff barriers and the negative impacts on trade flow due to the cost-increasing 
effect without considering their demand-enhancing effect, which may overestimate the 
standards‟ negative effect on trade flow and consumer welfare estimation. Our results 
suggest that by removing stricter standards, the efficiency gains might not overcome 
losses from reduced food safety.  Our analysis could be useful in the continuing debate 
over the “precautionary principle” and the SPS Agreement.  Scientific risk assessment to 
human health associated with food safety issues should be considered in setting standards, 
but the fact that the consumers‟ positive subjective assessment of food safety also plays 
an important role in enhancing demand for food should not be ignored.  They both impact 
the international trade flow. Our results suggest that sometimes more stringent food 
safety standards can facilitate trade and increase consumer welfare. Our article provides 
policymakers and analysts with an example of how the increased food safety and 
expanded trade can be compatible and even mutually reinforcing (Buzby and Unneveh, 
2003).  
One limitation of our study is that this is a single-market partial equilibrium analysis, 
so our results may overstate the welfare gain of EU consumers.  Therefore, our estimation 
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may provide an upper limit of welfare gain from implementing the harmonized EU 
aflatoxin standards. 
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